Judicial Management and Judicial Disinterest: The Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft Robert Post
William Howard Taft holds the significant distinction of being the only person in the history of the nation to preside over two branches of the federal government. He was President from 1909 to 1913, and he was Chief Justice of theunited States from 1921 States from to 1930 This achievement ought to have secured Taft a prominent position within the history of the Court. Yet Taft has drifted into almost complete professional eclipse. Although familiar to specialists in legal history, Taft is no more known to the average lawyer or law student than are Chief Justices White, Fuller, or Waite.
Taft's contemporary obscurity is remarkable. When Taft died on March 8, 1930 , the nation convulsed in an overpowering and spontaneous wave of mourning. He was widely characterized as "the most beloved of Americans,"* and hailed by observers like Augustus Hand, then a federal district Judge in New York, as "the greatest figure as Chief Justice since John Marshall."3 Even Felix Frankfurter, certainly no admirer of Taft's jurisprudence, was moved to observe that "Few public men have evoked such spontaneous and warm affection from the public as has Taft. . . . He is a dear man-a true human."4
This was a striking tribute to a man who had only eighteen years before been crushingly repudiated. Caught between Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, Taft was blasted as a reactionary, and managed to obtain only a humiliating eight electoral votes in his 19 12 campaign for reelection to the presidency. Taft took defeat graciously, however, and he quickly became, in the famous phrase ofjournalist George Harvey, "our worst licked and best loved President."5 Although Taft had been known as the father of the labor injunction since his days as an Ohio state court judge, he mollified organized labor during World War I by assuming the joint chairmanship (with Frank P. Walsh) of the National War Labor Board. The Board shocked industrial leaders not only by explicitly recognizing the right of American workers to unionize, but also by pledging official support for the right of employees to receive a "living wage."6 Taft also transcended partisan politics by opposing the leaders of his own party in courageously and publicly championing Woodrow Wilson's campaign to join the League of Nations. As a result, Harding's nomination of Taft for the Chief Justiceship in July 1921 was greeted with "almost unanimous approvaL"7 It was, as the The New York Times remarked, "a 'comeback' unprecedented in American political annals."* We may ask, then, how this man, who, as Walter Lippmann's New York World observed, retired "as Chief Justice with the enduring affection of his countrymen," with a "career" that "has no equal in our history,"g could have slipped so rapidly into such deep professional oblivion. The short answer, I think, may be found in Time magazine's pithy assessment of Taft's resignation: "Outstanding decisions: none." 'O It is not, of course, that Taft wrote few opinions. Indeed, from October 192 1 through July 1929, Taft authored 249 opinions for the Court. The prodigious nature of this accomplishment can be seen by contrasting Taft's Taft' s opinions were, as Holmes put it, "rather spongy."'* Although Taft authored a good many opinions that were, within the context of his time, quite important, his writing was seldom crisp or eloquent. 13 Taft' s opinions were often suffused with judicious common sense, which perversely blurred the expression of any sharpedged and therefore memorable jurisprudential visi0n.1~ Thus, at the time of Taft's death, even his supporters recognized that "His name will not be . . . connected with any outstanding decisions-as are the names, for instance, of Chief Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Taney."I5 Instead, Taft' s unique achievements were said to lie in "his success as an administrator of the complicated functions and activities of the [Supreme Court] . . . and his role as a supervisor of the Federal courts throughout the country."l6 His "lasting monument" was that he "laid the foundation for a reorganization of the judicial administration in this country."l7 Friend and foe alike acknowledged that Tafi "simplified and expedited the processes of the [Supreme] court and greatly improved the administration ofjustice in the Federal courts."l8 As Charles Evans Hughes accurately observed, Taft' s career "fittingly culminated in his work as Chief Justice," because the "efficient administration of justice was, after all, the dominant interest of his public life."l9
Hughes' observation suggests an important distinction between Associate Justices and a Chief Justice. The primary task of Associate Justices is to decide cases and deliver opinions, whereas the work of the Chief Justice also includes administrative responsibilities for the judicial branch of the federal government. Taft's current obscurity strongly indicates that enduring professional reputation depends upon the former task, but not the latter. Indeed, when Frankfurter praised Taft as a great "law reformer" and accorded him "a place in history . . . next to Oliver Ellsworth, who originally devised the judicial system,"zo he unwittingly revealed what a very small place that is.
It is, however, a place whose comers I shall attempt to illuminate. This paper shall assess Taft' s contributions as Chief Justice, rather than his general jurisprudence as expressed through his opinions. It is my hope that by so doing an important but largely overlooked aspect of our judicial history may be excavated. In particular, I shall examine both the birth of the effort to subject federal courts to a regime of efficient judicial management, and the simultaneous origin of important tensions between this regime and traditional American norms ofjudicial disinterest.
I
The distinct characteristics of the office of Chief Justicewere forcibly impressed upon Tat? almost immediately after his appointment. Harding nominated Taft on June 30,192 1, and the Senate confirmed Taft on that same day. At the time Taft was in Montreal, sitting as an arbitrator to determine the value of the Grand Trunk Railway Company, which was being nationalized by the Canadian government.21 Taft journeyed to Washington to take the oath of office at the Department of Justice on July 12. Returning to Canada to his summer home in Murray Bay, Quebec, he was telegraphed on July 30 by Justice Joseph McKenna, the Senior Associate Justice, that Deputy Clerk Henry McKenney had passed away.22
This posed a serious difficulty for the Court, because its Clerk, James D. Maher, had died on June 3. At the time, federal law provided that the Clerk could only be appointed by the Court.23 If the Clerk died, the Deputy Clerk could "perform the duties of the clerk in his name until a clerk is appointed and qualified."24 With the death of Deputy Clerk McKenney, however, the Clerk's ofice was, as Assistant Clerk William R. Stansbury telegraphed Taft, "now without an official head and no one authorized to issue official papers."25 Yet a Court could not be gathered to appoint a new Clerk.
Taft promptly returned to Washington to meet with McKenna. Telegraphic consultation with those Associate Justices who could be contacted proved unhelpful, which, as Taft wrote, "only shows what McKenna assured me that the other members of the Court expect me to attend to the executive business of the Court and not bother them." McKenna impressed the point on his new Chief: "McKenna said I must realize that the Chief Justiceship was an office distinct from that of the Associates in executive control and was intended to be and all of the Associates recognized it, that in judicial decisions all were equal but in management I must act and they would all stand by if ever question was made."26 Taft boldly and promptly resolved "to do something without statutory authority"27 and appoint Stansbury "de facto deputy clerk,"2* exacting "a common law bond from him to protect everybody."29 He had learned a valuable lesson about the distinction and prerogatives of the Chief Justiceship.
Chief Justices are typically evaluated as to how well they employ these prerogatives to administer the day-to-day functioning of the Court. They are scrutinized for their handling of small emergencies, like the death of Deputy Clerk McKenney, and for their ability to dispose efficiently of routinized institutional necessities like assigning opinions or moderating the Court's Conferences. Measured by these standards, it is clear that Taft was a highly successful Chief Justice. He was ruthlessly efficient, moving heaven and earth to force the Court to diminish its embarrassingly large backlog of cases. Louis D. Brandeis remarked to Felix Frankfurter that Taft, "like the Steel Corporation, is attaining [all] time production records."30 In the popular press it was said of Taft that "The spirit of speed and efficiency lurlang in the corpulent form of an ex-President of the United States has entered the Court and broken up its old lethargy."g* Within the Court the dominant image of Taft was not that of a disciplinarian, but rather of a man who could dispose "of executive details . . . easily" and "get through them without friction."32 "The new Chief Justice makes the work very pleasant," Holmes said. "He is always good natured and carries things along with a smile or a laugh. (It makes a devil of a difference if the C.J.'s temperament diminishes friction.) He is very open to suggestions and appreciates the labors of others. I rather think the other JJ. are as pleased as I am."33 Brandeis concurred in this positive assessment:
On the personal side the present C.J. has admirable qualities, a great improvement on the late C.J.; he smoothes out difficulties instead of making them. It's astonishing he should have been such a horribly bad President, for he has considerable executive ability. The fact, probably, is that he cared about law all the time and nothing else. He has an excellent memory, makes quick decisions on questions of administration that arise and if a large output were the chief desideratum, he would be very good.34
Taft's genial and winning personality was particularly useful in managing the Court's potentially contentious conferences. Holmes said that "The meetings are perhaps pleasanter than I ever have known them -thanks largely to the C.J."35. The Justices also appreciated how "fairly" Taft distributed case assignments.36 Indeed, Harlan Fiske Stone later remarked that "there was never a Chief Justice as generous to his brethren in the assignment of cases."37 Most important, however, Taft exercised a natural leadership within the Court.38 As Augustus Hand wrote to him:
You have a certain leadership in the Court that is enormously important and I don't believe has ever existed since the times of Marshall himself. Indeed I think Brandeis, in the left wing, greatly appreciates this and knows how much it means to have a C.J. whom the Court will in certain respects follow and at any rate will "rally around."39 Supervising the ongoing institutional routines of the Court in this manner has been an essential task of every Chief Justice since Marshall. Some Chief Justices, like Taft, have fulfilled these challenges more successfully than others, but all Chief Justices have understood and accepted these obligations of their office. Tafi's unique accomplishment, however, is that he managed to expand the very concept of the Chief Justiceship, so that his successors have also in part been judged by their responses to responsibilities not even perceptible before Taft. "It is certain," Robert Steamer writes in his study of the Chief Justiceship, "that the office was never quite the same after he left it."40 My concern in this paper will be with the question of how Taft transformed the role of Chief Justice, and my contention will be that he did so by endowing it with a distinctive managerial outlook, one that he had acquired as Chief Executive of the nation.
This claim may sound strange, given Taft's notorious inadequacies as President. Taft readily admitted that as President he felt "just a bit like a fish out of water,"41 and that he was "not fond of politics."42 It was said of Taft that as President he constituted "a very large body completely surrounded by politician^."^^ Indeed, Taft's reputation as a politician was so very bad that he could effectively mock Senator William Borah's denunciation of Taft's own nomination as Harding's effort "to take a politician . . . and put him on the Supreme Bench in the interest of party politics":44 I seem to have heard a suggestion, by way of friendly criticism, when my name was up for the Chief Justiceship, that a politician was being put upon the bench. All I have to say is, that that was news to me (renewed and increasing laughter), and I think it was news to the people.45
Yet while Taft may have been, as William Allen White trenchantly put it, "innocent of politi~s,"~~ he was always a capable administrator, determined to improve the efficient management of the executive And it is this perspective that Taft brought with him into the Chief Justiceship. Most specifically, Taft viewed the federal judiciary as a coherent branch of government to be managed, and he viewed the Chief Justiceship as the source of that management. This perspective was fundamentally new, and its implications were profound.
In the next section, I should like to unfold some of the most salient consequences of this perspective for Taft's reworking of the position of the Chief Justiceship in its relationship to the federal judiciary and to the Congress.
I1
The most obvious expression of Taft's vision of the federal judiciary was the Act of September 14, 1922,48 which, as Felix Frankfurter and James Landis have accurately noted, marked "the beginning of a new chapter in the administration of the federal courts."49 The Act not only authorized the Chief Justice to assign district court judges temporarily to sit wherever in the country the needs of the docket were greatest,50 but it also created a Conference of Senior Circuit Judges to "advise as to . . . any matters in respect of which the administration ofjustice in the courts of the United States may be improved," and in particular to "make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts of the United States and prepare plans for assignment and transfer ofjudges to or from circuits or districts where the state of the docket or condition of business indicates the need therefor."51 The effect of the Act, as Taft observed, was to introduce "into ourjudicial system. . . an executive principle to secure effective teamwork," so that "judicial force" could be deployed "economically and at the points where most needed."52 In Taft's view, the primary virtue of the Act was to empower the Chief Justice and the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges "temporarily to mass the force of the judiciary where the arrears are greatest."53
Taft had been advocating a reform like this for years,54 and there was little doubt among contemporaries that the ultimate shape of the statute, as well as its enactment, were "largely the result" of his "active advocacy."55 Taft lobbied hard for the bill, effectively mobilizing his numerous contacts within Congress, and he rightly received the lion's share of the credit for the results.56 Four aspects of the Act of September 14,1922, require emphasis, because each embodies an outlook on the federal judicial branch that reflects the influence of Taft's experience as President.
First, and most fundamentally, the Act implied "a functional unification of the United States judiciary."57 Just as the executive branch has always been seen as an integrated whole, directed by the President, the Act for the first time conceptualized federal judges as also integrated into a single, coherent branch of the federal government designed to attain functional objectives. Previously, as Frankfurter has observed, "federal judges throughout the country were entirely autonomous, little independent sovereigns. Every judge had his own little principality. He was the boss within his district, and his district was his only concern."58 The Act, in contrast, "organized" the "whole judicial force . . . as a unit, with authority to send expeditions to spots needing aid."59
This idea may seem obvious to us today, but in 1922 it provoked great resistance. No less a judge than Henry D. Clayton (after whom the Clayton Act was named) attacked the Act as manifesting "a dictatorial power over the courts unrecognized in our jurisprudence."60 Clayton objected to "the war idea of mobilizing judges under a supreme commander as soldiers are massed and ordered." He argued that "judges are not soldiers but servants, and the people only are the masters whom they serve."6' To protests like these, Taft responded with the brutal and implacable language of instrumental rationality. Although he conceded that "in the judicial work a judge does on the bench, he must be independent," Taft insisted that "in the disposition of his time and the cases he is to hear, he should be subject to a judicial council that makes him a cog in the machine and makes him work with all the others to dispose of the business which courts are organized to do."62 The premise that judges are "organized" to accomplish a collective function renders the federal judiciary structurally parallel to an executive agency, which is conceptualized according to a similar logic. Second, if judges are "cogs in a machine," there must also exist some intelligence that directs the machine. Organizations require guidance, and the functional unification of the judiciary thus implied that the judicial branch be subject to "the executive management" of "a head charged with the responsibility of the use of the judicial force at places and under conditions where judicial force is needed."63 In this way the Act transformed the federal judiciary from an "entirely headless and decentralized" institution,@ into one capable of "executive supervision." 65 Taft defended this transformation as merely a matter of "introducing into the administration of justice the ordinary business principles in successful executive work."66 He argued that the massive increase in federal litigation required that "we must approach the problems of its disposition in the same way that the head of a great industrial establishment approaches the question of the manufacture of the amount that he will need, to meet the demand for the goods which he makes."67 But in fact the necessity of executive supervision was also central to Taft's conception of the President as ultimately responsible for the "administrative control" of the executive branch.68 In Taft's mind the Chief Justice, using the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges as a kind of cabinet, was responsible for the management of the judicial branch, just as the President was responsible for the management of the executive branch.69
The managerial obligations that Tafl imported into the office of Chief Justice were not exhausted by the operation of the Conference. Taft enthusiastically embraced a sense of generic responsibility for the over-all functioning of the federal judiciary. Exemplary are the letters Taft would write to judges who had failed to decide submitted cases for unconscionably long periods of time:
I write in the interest of the administration ofjustice, and for the reputation of the Federal Judiciary, that you dispose of the patent case, which you now must have had at hand and submitted to you for more than four years. . . . I write this letter with no assumption that I may exercise direct authority over you in the discharge of your duties, but as the head of the Federal Judiciary I feel that I do have the right to appeal to you, in its interest and in the interest of the public whom it is created to serve, to end this indefensible situation.70
To accept forthrightly managerial responsibility in this way is not merely to seize the potential of executive supervision, but also to create lines of accountability. For this reason Chief Justice Hughes, when the Court in the 1930s was subject to withering political assaults, chose to diminish the exposure and vulnerability of such an aggressive managerial posture by seeking as Chief Justice to decentralize federal judicial adrnini~tration.~] But Taft, in the full flush of progressive reform and personal popularity, had no such qualms.
Third, Taft knew that the management of the judicial branch would require the exercise of the deeply human virtues of leadership, inspiration, and a commitment to what Taft repeatedly called "teamwork, uniformity in action and an interest by all the judges in the work of each district."7* Taft viewed the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges as a means for serving these various management functions. The Conference "is a good thing," said Taft, because it "solidifies the Federal Judiciary" and "brings all the district judges within a mild disciplinary circle, and makes them feel that they are under real observation by the other judges and the c~untry. ' '~~ The Conference was also a method of gathering information about the state of the federal judiciary, of collecting both statistical and narrative data. And the Conference was a tool for "trying to come in touch with the Federal Judges of the country, so that we may feel more allegiance to a team and do more teamwork."74 The Conference could generate the "esprit" that came from close coordination.75
The Conference, however, was only one tool for exercising executive leadership. In fact, Taft seized the opportunity for such leadership in all his dealings with federal judges. He was always "glad to keep in touch with the District Judges," because "they are the wheel horses of our system, and I want them to know that they have the deepest sympathy in their efforts in the dispatch of business."76 He would write to a Circuit Judge requesting "a long gossipy letter so that I may acquire intimate knowledge of the situation."77 District Judges throughout the nation deeply appreciated this attention and care, and they wrote to Taft expressing their pleasure.78 Learned Hand, for example, said to Taft that "It is a great comfort to know the interest that you take. To be frank, we have never felt it before your incumbency."79 As a good executive, Taft wished "to have all the members of the Federal Judiciary realize that we are remanded to the top, and that whatever we can do here in Washington to help, we will do."*O Fourth, the corollary of the functional unification of the federal judiciary was that the judicial branch could now articulate its ongoing and routinized requirements to the legislature, just as did the executive branch. The Con-ference was the perfect institutional vehicle for this articulation, and Taft conceived it as enabling "the judiciary to express itself in respect of certain subjects in such a way as to be helpful to Congress."8* Taft rapidly and effectively molded the Conference into a voice for the institutional needs of the judicial branch.82 As he accurately reported to the Conference in 1925: "The recommendations of this Conference have a good deal of influence. I mean that they are accepted as matters for serious consideration."*3
Taft was unwilling, however, to regard the Conference as the exclusive voice of the judiciary.% He believed quite strongly that the Chief Justice was the primary national spokesman for the cause of the administration of justice, and he therefore sought to maintain an active personal presence in Congress in matters that transcended the pronouncements of the Conference.85 In this regard Taft hnctioned as an independent lobbyist for a legislative agenda, much as he would have as Chief Executive.86 It is to this aspect of Taft's conception of the chiefjusticeship that I would now like to turn.
111
From the very outset of his chief justiceship, Taft "thought that it was part of my duty" as the head of the federal judiciary, "to suggest needed reforms, and to become rather active in pressing them before" C0ngress.8~ Taft was quite aware that this was a new conception of his office. "I don't think the former Chief Justice had so much to do in the matter of legislation as I have," he wrote to his brother Horace, but "I don't object to it, because I think Chief Justices ought to take part in that."88 Throughout his service on the Court Taft was a frequent witness before congressional committees, lobbying hard for judicial reforms. Taft's relentless determination "to keep pressing" Congress for legislation89 began almost immediately after he assumed office. On October 5, 192 1, he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of the Act of September 14, 1922 . He realized that he had "violated the precedent in doing this," but he was unfazed, because "I am determined to exercise such influence as I have to help the judicial system of the country. Precedents that keep the judges away from committees who are to help are not precedents that appeal to me."9* By March 30, 1922, in the course of testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in favor of bills to enlarge the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and to reform the compensation of the Court Reporter, Taft could comfortably remark that "I hate to be in the attitude of a continual beggar from Congress, but I seem to have arrived at the court just when it was necessary."gl Taft did not hesitate to draft his colleagues on the Court to assist in his lobbying efforts. In 1926, for example, he brought Justices Holmes and Brandeis with him to make the case before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee for a deficiency appropriation to enable the First Circuit to purchase an urgently needed bar library. "I wanted to bring some big guns to bear," Taft explained. "I am a constant visitor and I did not consider that I had influence enough. This is a real emergency."92
The presence of Taft's political foes on congressional committees, particularly in the Senate, sometimes rendered his persona1 testimony counter-productive. In pressing for the legislation reforming the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, for example, Taft It is clear, then, that Taft did not regard the chief justiceship as an accommodating civil servant, essentially passive although ready to provide helpfid advice when requested by competent legislative authorities. Taft instead understood the position as analogous to an executive official fully authorized to conceive and "push" a legislative agenda. He realized that the responsibility of managing the judicial branch carried within it the ancillary responsibility of promoting legislative reforms that would ensure the effectiveness of such management. The logic of this position remains manifest to this day. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, for example, in a recent annual address on "the state of the judiciary" -an address whose deliberate evocation of the President's annual State of the Union address would have been inconceivable before Taft's transformation of the chief justiceship4hose to stress the proposition that the federal courts and Congress "must work together if feasible solutions are to be found to the practical problems that confront today's federal judiciary."96 A small but telling example of the energetic and comprehensive manner in which Taft pursued this aspect of the chiefjusticeship may be found in the history of Public Law No. 563, which ended the practice in federal courts of charging defendants with a fee to receive copies of their own indictments.97
In November 1925, Taft received a letter from Joseph Coursey, an unknown lawyer from South Dakota, complaining of "the failure of Federal law . . . to provide a copy of the charge to the defendant. . . . It seems to me it should be almost fundamental that a defendant be given as a matter of right a copy of the accusation against him."98 Taft responded by asking Coursey whether the charge for the indictment was imposed "by law, or whether it rests in a local rule of practice."99 Coursey answered that he did "not know whether the rule is one of law or practice but I know positively that in this District we can not obtain such a copy without paying for it except in two cases: namely-if the defendant is charged with homicide or will make a pauper showing." 'oo Taft then wrote to Solicitor General William Mitchell, asking him to find out "whether it is the practice to fwnish defendants with copies of the indictment." He enclosed Coursey's letter, adding "I am rather inclined to think that he has a good case, and that the defendant should be given a copy, at the expense of the Govemment. ' 'IO' Mitchell sent back a detailed, six-page letter, explaining that federal statutes currently required clerks "to charge the accused for copies of the indictments, except in cases involving capital offenses," and that courts had deemed the requirements of the Sixth Amendment satisfied "by the formality of reading the indictment to [the defendant] when he is arraigned." Mitchell went on to caution that "if clerks are directed generally to furnish copies of the indictments without charge to the accused, it would greatly increase the volume of work to be performed in the clerk's office, particularly on account of the large number of cases under the National Prohibition Act, and that the clerks' offices are now shorthanded as the result of lack of adequate appropriation."l02 Not deterred by Mitchell's warning, Taft wrote to Senator Albert Cummins, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, explaining the situation and commenting that "I should think . . . that the Government ought to furnish, at its own expense, indictments to defendants."l03 Taft viewed the question as one ofjustice, rather than constitutional compulsion, and he dismissed the potential bureaucratic burden with the observation that clerks could easily type indictments in triplicate. Cummins agreed with Taft's assessment, and he asked Taft to "prepare a Bill relating to furnishing copies of indictments to defendants and send it to me. I will be glad to introduce it."104 Taft requested that Mitchell draft a bill, which the Solicitor General did, noting that "those in charge of the appropriations for the Department of Justice have estimated that" the bill would "substantially increase the expenses of operating the offices of the clerks of the courts. . . . I have explained, however, that this Bill is not being furnished you as a Department measure, but merely as the result of a personal request for a document to supply Senator Cummins' wants."IO5 Taft forwarded Mitchell's draft to Cummins, who agreed to "introduce the bill and have it referred to the Committee."Io6 The result was Public Law No. 563, which became law in January 1927.
That Taft would take the time to evaluate the complaint of an unknown, unsophisticated, and provincial lawyer, that he would summon the energy and will to remedy that complaint in the face of bureaucratic opposition, that he could command the personal respect and assistance of leaders in the executive and legislative branches in this task, all reveal much about Taft's construction of the role of Chief Justice. In Taft's eyes, the chief justiceship was much closer in spirit and responsibility to the English position of Lord Chancellor, an executive official whose portfolio included the administration of justice, than to any previous American model of a federal judge.
The English model of an executive judicial official did not, however, fit easily into American circumstances. Reform in the American context often required political mobilization, which potentially conflicted with traditional American norms of judicial nonpartisanship.
Taft was keenly aware of this tension. When Taft became Chief Justice he gave up an editorial column in which he had commented regularly on current events, stating:
The degree in which a judge should separate himself from general activities as a citizen and a member of the community is not usually fixed by statutory law but by a due sense of propriety, considering the nature of his office, and by well-established custom. Certainly, in this country at least, a judge should keep out of politics and out of any diversion or avocation which may involve him in politics. It is one of those characteristic queer inconsistencies in the British judicial system, which was the forerunner of our own, that the highest judicial officer in Great Britain, the Lord Chancellor, is often very much in politics and has always been.'"'
The passage is noteworthy because it casts a wistful glance at the office of the English Lord Chancellor at the very moment that it acknowledges distinctively American obligations of judicial disinterest.
Despite his good intentions, Taft very quickly found that he could not contain his "bursting expression."l08 He believed that he could reconcile his commitment to law reform with American judicial norms by speaking out only to bar associations in order to mobilize them to lobby in support of measures for the reform of the administration ofjustice. "One of the most important extra curriculum things that I have to do as Chief Justice," he said, is "to organize the Bench and the Bar into a united group in this country dedicated to the cause of the improvement ofjudicial procedure."l09 Elihu Root in fact commented to Taft that he was "the first Chief Justice to fully appreciate the dynamics of the Bar as an organization. If a national bar spirit can be created it will have an immense effect upon the administration of justice." 'lO Taft began his program of mobilizing the bar almost immediately upon taking office. On August 30, 1921, he spoke to the Judicial Section of the American Bar Association, seeking support for what would later become the Act of September 14, 1922.l1l Four months later, he spoke to the Chicago Bar Association, seeking support for the Act, as well as for the simplification of federal procedure and the expansion of certiorari jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.ll* These speeches were criticized on the floor of the United States Senate as "different from those made by any other Chief Justice. ''Ll3 Senator William J. Harris of Georgia opined that "the judiciary is going to be injured, and the people will not have the same high respect for it if the Chief Justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States make speeches in public not in their line of duty as has been done recently. "'l4 Taft, however, was defiant. Three days later he shot back in an address to the New York County Bar Association: I venture to think that there are some things that a judge may speak of and may discuss in public and not use a judicial opinion for the purpose. The subject is that of law reform. From the earliest traditions of the English bench from which we get our customs, the judges of the highest courts of Great Britain have taken an interest in and a part in the formulation of legislation for bettering the administration of justice. They have written and spoken on such subjects with entire freedom and without incurring criticism. You doubtless remember that in Campbell' usually prepared by the law oficers of the government and sometimes by the Lord Chancellor himself. The judges of the Supreme Court have taken an active part in the discussion of the measures as they go through their legislative course. And why should it not be so? With their attention constantly directed toward the workings of the machinery of the administration ofjustice, they are at a more advantageous point of observation and if they use their opportunities, are better able to make recommendations with respect to law reform than any other class in the community.115
Taft never did retreat from his program of mobilizing political support for the cause of judicial reform. He understood well enough that American judges were appropriately reluctant to engage "in extra-judicial activities" because they might be cast into positions "actually or seemingly inconsistent with absolute impartiality in the discharge o f . . . judicial duties."I16 But, explicitly invoking the precedent of the English Chancellors, Taft apparently believed that advocacy of judicial reform would not compromise his judicial impartiality because, as he said, he could "discuss" this subject "in public and not use a judicial opinion for the purpose." As a good child of the Progressive era, Taft seemingly regarded judicial reform as purely technical and apolitical.117
But of course in the American context any such belief is merely naive, and so in at least two distinct ways Taft's public advocacy sometimes threw him perilously close to violating judicial norms of disinterested neutrality. First, in America there was simply no clear line distinguishing judicial reform from partisan politics. This can perhaps best be illustrated by Taft's it through without the country's being advised about it."l21 He saw the bill as "a great attack on the administration of justice in this country,"122 the "most radical bill affecting the usefulness and efficacy of the Federal Judiciary that I remember ever to have heard suggested."l23 Taft threw himself into the task of "trying to save the life of the Federal Judiciary."124
It quickly became apparent, however, that Taft's opposition to S. 3 15 1 could not be confined to the nonpartisan expression of expertise. Thus when Taft wrote "to sound an alarm on the subject" to his friend Casper Yost, editor of the influential St. Louis Globe-Democrat, he cautioned that "I am so situated that I can not take a political part, but . . . I invoke your influence in maintaining the protective power which citizens may secure from the Federal Judiciary in defense of their rights."I25 Yost responded by publishing a lively editorial.126
That Taft thoroughly understood and was willing to exploit the explosive politics of S. 3 15 1 is evident from a letter he sent to his brother, Henry W. Taft, an influential member of the New York Bar,127 urging him to begin a public campaign against the bill:
Now my own judgment about this bill is that ifNorris tries to get it through, and is supported by the Democrats, it will prove to be dynamite in the next campaign. It will rouse every negro in the United States, and they cast a great many votes now in the large cities since they have moved north, and when it becomes known to them that they can not resort to the local Federal courts, they will certainly be convinced, as they ought to be, that they are suffering a practical deprivation of their Federal rights and protection. I think you ought to go to the New York Times and to the Tribune and explain the effect of the bill and have editorials printed on the subject. Reference to the negroes will find an echo, and I am quite sure that the Times will feel like warning the Democratic party against any such radical measure. I think you ought to bring it to Hilles' attention and that the opposition to it ought to be made a plank in the National Republican Platform.128
When Henry proved inept in generating publicity, paralyzed by Charles Evans Hughes' fear that anything "coming from New York" would be dismissed as reflecting "Wall Street interests,"1z9 Taft lost patience.I30 "What I was anxious to do," he explained, "was to head the movement by an announcement in the New York Times, for there are a great many people who look to the Times as a kind of Bible."131 Henry accepted the "rebuke" and promptly contacted Rollo Ogden, editor of The New York Times. 132 On April 22 the Sunday Times published an editorial strongly opposing the bi11. 133 The fierce controversy that surrounded S. 3 15 1 simultaneously concerned politics and the administration of justice; the two were inseparably combined. Taft knew that he could not risk overt involvement, yet his name and views figured prominently in the debate. On the floor of the Senate, for example, Senator Royal Copeland of New York, seeking to have the bill remanded to the Committee for hearings, observed that "I am advised by the attorneys who have spoken to me that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court feels that the bill is not a good bill in some respect~."13~ In its editorial, The New York Times specifically referred to this comment, remarking that "It is no secret, since the fact was stated in the Senate by Mr. Copeland ofNew York, that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court regards some of the features of this bill as most undesirable and harmfu1."135 Two weeks later, Senator Duncan Fletcher of Florida had reprinted in the Congressional Record an editorial in the American Bar Association Journal strongly opposing S. 3 15 1, which relied heavily on arguments attributed to Taft,'36 as well as an editorial from the Florida Times Union that opposed the bill in part on the grounds that "the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. , . is reported to have said that this bill has features that can be regarded only as most undesirable and harmAs a result of the accumulating pressure, Norris was forced to amend his bill to restore federal question jurisdiction.l38 Taft wrote Henry, "I think Norris has heard a good deal about his proposed changes, and . . . he does not find them so easy to push through as he thought he would, in view of the agitation you have all stirred up on the subject. ''139 Norris' revised bill eventually stalled in the Senate. Yet Tafi's intense struggle to defeat it illustrated the uneasy line between disinterested law reform and unabashedly political mobilization.
The second reason why Taft's Despite his ongoing struggle with Walsh over S. 3151, Taft was sweetly and nonpartisanly solicitous: "I am sorry to impose on you, my dear Senator, another burden, but as I understand you are on the committee for the consideration ofthis bill, I venture thus to write to you. It will certainly help the administration of justice in the Most striking from a modern point of view, however, is that Taft included in his letter a long defense of the bill's constitutionality, which began: I understand that there are two persons who think that the bill is unconstitutional. I can not for the life of me understand how any such doubt could arise. The Court of Customs Appeals is a purely statutory court, and Congress is not limited in any way in the hnctions which it gives to it.143
Walsh replied to Taft that he would "make an effort to have the matter put in" shape for approva1,144 and the bill, seemingly uncontroversial, was enacted into law March 2, 1929.145 It is remarkable that Taft would submit an advisory opinion about the constitutionality In this country, as distinct from England, the institution of judicial review renders advisory opinions dangerously uncertain, and this poses a powerful dilemma for a Chief Justice who would accept responsibility for pushing a legislative agenda for judicial reform. For legislative change cannot be proposed without being endorsed, and how could Taft endorse legislation without rendering an advisory opinion?l48
The dialectic of this dilemma is vividly exposed in the story of Taft's attempt to relieve federal courts of the flood of small criminal cases that Prohibition had swept into their jurisdiction. Not only did these cases clog the docket, but federal judges found them intensely demoralizing.149 Almost from the day he took office Taft believed that legislation was needed to allow United States Commissioners to try such cases.150 In 1923, at the second meeting ofthe Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, Taf? pushed through a resolution to the effect that "in prohibition and other misdemeanor cases" U.S. Commissioners be authorized "in all cases in which the defendants do not file written demands for jury trial, to take and file written pleas of guilty and to hear the evidence on pleas of not guilty and to file in court their reports of the cases and their recommendations of what judgment should be entered."l51 Taft regarded this resolution as one of the "most important" of the Conference.152
The recommendation went nowhere, however, and so in December 1925 Taft on his own initiative sought to revive the plan. He wrote to Representative George S. Graham, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, and to Senator Albert Cummins, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that he was "very much troubled about the conditions that prevail in the District Courts of the United States. They are being demoralized by this police court business." Taft proposed an elaborate legislative scheme to remedy the situation.
How would this suggestion strike you? Provide that in every District there should be appointed a Judicial Commissioner to serve during good behavior, that he should have authority to hold court, try jury trials and have jurisdiction to try misdemeanors and felonies, punishment for which shall not exceed two years' imprisonment; that he should be given the power to compel the defendants to elect whether they desire jury trials within ten days after the filing of the information or the indictment; that he should be required to act also as a regular United States Commissioner, and might be called upon by the District Judge to act as a Master in Chancery or a Referee. . . . I don't think he thought to be appointed by the President, but that as Judicial Commissioner his might be regarded as an inferior office, and under the Constitution he could be appointed by the District Court . . . . Can not you think this over and frame a bill? Something ought to be done. I just throw out this suggestion, with the hope that it may germinate into something.153
Six months later, in the course of debate on a bill to authorize the appointment of additional district judges, Representative Graham observed on the floor of the House that he was "in conference with representatives of the Senate Judiciary Committee and some of the judges of the Supreme Court trying to work out some scheme by which the courts of the United States might be relieved of some of the very heavy burdens which they are now obliged to carry." Graham pledged to "strive to create some plan by which a minor judiciary may be created."*54 Representative Duncan Denison of Illinois rose to inquire into "the wisdom of taking into these conferences, in trying to work out legislation that will relieve the courts of a part of their work, the members of the Supreme Court. Does the gentleman think that is a wise policy?"l55 Thrown on the defensive, Graham quickly backpedaled:
Mr. GRAHAM. Well, without passing any opinion upon the wisdom of the policy, it came about without our solicitation and we attended simply as conferees.
Mr. DENISON. In the constitutional convention . . . that theory was abandoned as being unwise, the theory of having the Supreme Court advise the Congress as to legislation, and I think if we should return to that policy it would be a dangerous one.
Mr. GRAHAM. I may say that this conference arose and was called through the intervention of the Supreme Court judges, upon one of whom, the Chief Justice, there depended the duty of reviewing the work in the district courts all over the United States in the congested districts and trying to provide a remedy. He simply called the chairman and the ranking member of each Judiciary Committee in to ask them to take up the subject and see if there could not be some plan devised. That is all.
Mr. DENISON. What I have in mind is this. Suppose the Congress should enact legislation that is intended to create some sort of subordinate courts to relieve the other courts of some of their duties, and afterwards the constitutionality of the legislation should be raised in the courts, if the Supreme Court had been consulted and advised in the preparation of the law, it seems to me it would be embarrassing, and I do not believe the committee of the House ought to do that.
Mr. GRAHAM. I think, perhaps, ethically the gentleman is correct, and I am not going to dispute that proposition, but I do say it was perfectly competent for those who had charge of the court business throughout the country to call our attention to it and ask us to take it up independently; and that is all that was done.
Mr. DENISON. I see no objection to that.
Mr. GRAHAM. That is all that was done. They would not be taken into consideration in framing the legislation for the legislative duty would rest upon the House and the Senate.Is6
The dialogue crisply captures the dilemma of any American Chief Justice aspiring to advocate legislative reform. Representative Graham deftly defused Denison's challenge by asserting that Taft had merely called the attention of members of Congress to a problem in need of solution, without proposing any particular legislative response. But we know from Taft's correspondence of six months earlier that this was not true. Had the real facts been known, Taft' s "embarrassment" would indeed have been acute.
Taft apparently took the point. When Frances Caffey subsequently wrote him to inquire about the status of the 1923 recommendation of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges so as to be able more effectively to lobby for bills expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. Commissioners then pending before Congress,157 Taft responded with uncharacteristic caution: "I have to be careful in taking part myself in the preparation of such a bill, because any bill is likely to come before our Court for interpretation and inquiry into its validity."ls* Taft's zeal to refashion judicial administration had been checked by the institutional realities of American judicial review.
Sometimes, however, that zeal pushed Taft plainly beyond what would today be regarded as elementary norms ofjudicial propriety. The strong temptations generated by his urgent sense of responsibility for the federal judicial branch are well revealed by his struggle against S. 624, a bill sponsored by Senator Thaddeus Caraway of Arkansas that would make it reversible error for a federal judge to comment on the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the eviden~e.15~ Most states prohibited judges from such comments, and Taft had long regarded these prohibitions as empowering "acute and eloquent counsel for the defense" to promote "an atmosphere of fog and error and confusion," and so drastically to impede the orderly administration ofjustice.160 For decades he had taken every opportunity passionately to oppose them.161 So when S. 624 was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and then by the Senate itself, Taft was galvanized into action.
"I am trying to prevent the passage of a bill aimed at the usefulness of the Federal courts," he wrote to his wife: which seeks to deny to Federal Judges the power to comment on the evidence as the English Judges do. This has always been done in the Federal Courts and has contributed much to their effectiveness. Now these demagogues and damage lawyers are attempting to put the Federal Courts on the basis of the State courts in this regard. The bill has passed the Senate and the Senators yielded supinely, except Reed of Pennsylvania. It has been reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, but I am hoping to hold it over until the next session, in which case I feel fairly confident that I can induce the President to veto it, and I believe his veto would prevent its passage. There is a serious question as to whether it is constitutional, but I would prefer much to have it beaten through a veto than to throw upon the Court the question of its constitutionality. 162 Tafi attempted to secure a commitment from Judiciary Committee Chair George S. Graham to hold hearings on the bill in the House, and he sought "to have the various Bar Associations . . . apply to the committee to be heard upon this bill in opposition to it, both on the ground of its doubtful constitutionality and also because of its interference with the efficiency of the Federal courts."163 Not content with this blatantly political maneuvering and mobilization, Taft on December 2,1924, composed a remarkable Memorandum in opposition to the bill. The cover sheet to the Memorandum, which Taft apparently drafted for his own records, states:
I am exceedingly anxious to beat the bill. . . because it will really greatly interfere with the Federal judicial system. I was able to hold the bill off last session through Chairman Graham and Snell of the Rules Committee in the House. I have been to see the Attorney General once or twice about it and I saw the President this morning and asked him to read this memorandum. I am quite sure that he will be inclined to veto the bill, but it ought not to come to him, and I think the Attorney General suggests his sending for Graham and Nick Longworth to see whether it can not be shelved. I submitted the memorandum to Van De Vanter [sic] and he fully approved the statement, but he thought that I put a little too much admiration for the English in it. However, as this is not to be published and is only a confidential memorandum for the President and the Attorney General, and as I have only given out one copy in addition to that given to Van Devanter, there is no occasion for changing my view which is stated herein, or ameliorating it with reference to prejudices against England.164
The Memorandum itself is a twelve-page document arguing that the Caraway bill would greatly "weaken the usefulness and efficiency of Federal Courts in the dispatch of business involving jury trials."16s On page six the Memorandum addresses the "question . . . whether Congress may by law effect this demoralizing assault on the trials in our Federal Courts. Fortunately the right of the Judge to exercise this power of summing up to a jury upon the facts is conferred upon him by the Constitution of the United States, and can not be taken away by legislation."166 The remainder of the Memorandum constitutes a detailed argument for this proposition, concluding:
In view of these authorities, it can not be that Congress may take away the power of a Judge of a United States Court in carrying on a jury trial, to comment on the evidence and even express his opinion on the facts, if he leaves the question of facts clearly to the jury ultimately. It was an essential element of a jury trial in the English courts when the Declaration of Independence was signed and our Constitution was framed and adopted and when the 7th Amendment became part of it. That being true, Congress may not impair the institution by attempting to restrain Federal Judges from the discretion to exercise the power vested in them by the fundamental iaW. 167
The Memorandum is a stunning document. It is a fidly developed advisory opinion, crafted by Taft for the explicit purpose of affecting the outcome of legislation. Taft knew that the Memorandum was ethically suspect, which is why he controlled so tightly its dissemination. It is revealing that at first Taft circulated the Memorandum only to the President, with whose structural position vis-a-vis Congress Taft clearly felt a strong affinity.
As Caraway continued to press his legislation, however, Tafi grew bolder. In March he wrote to his brother Henry that "We stopped the Caraway bill to take away the power of the Federal Judges in charging a jury, and I am going to take time by the forelock to prime Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania on the probable unconstitutionality of such a law. '' 16* Taft enclosed a copy of his Memorandum,169 and in May he suggested to Henry that "If I were you I would open a correspondence with the only man who opposed it in the Senate, and that was Senator Reed of Pennsylvania. You might send a copy of it also to Senator C u m i n s and another one to Senator Gillett. Don't make me the author of it, for reasons that you will understand."l70 Tafi's opposition to the Caraway bill never did erupt into scandal, although this seems more a matter of luck than anything else. The very intensity that Taft brought to the cause of judicial administration betrayed him into actions that could scarcely be defended in public. Of course, on the other side of the coin, it is no doubt due to Taft's vigorous interventions that federal judges enjoy to this day the traditional common law prerogative to comment on the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses.171 But this result cannot justify the means Taft used, which can only be explained by reference both to the passion of his commitment and to the inherent ambiguities of the English model of a judicial executive administrator. Taft's opposition to S . 624 demonstrates what a dangerous model this could be when transposed to the American context.
Iv
It was said of Taft that the chiefjusticeship was his "manifest destiny."17* Certainly he freely admitted that the office was "the ambition of my life."l73 When Taft finally attained that ambition, it was after a long career of executive administration: as Governor of the Philippines, Secretary of War, and President of the United States. Taft brought this experience with him as he appropriated the role of Chief Justice and made it his own. It was natural for him to regard the administrative duties of the chiefjusticeship as analogous to the executive responsibilities with which he was so familiar, especially because there were powerful English precedents for this approach to judicial administration.
The most lasting effect of Taft's unique perspective was its root assumption that the federal judiciary was not a collection of independent judges, but instead a unified branch of government with functional obligations. No Chief Justice after Taft has been able to escape being evaluated on his fidfillment of these obligations. In this regard, Taft did indeed transform the office of Chief Justice.
But Taft, flush with the enthusiasm of a new idea, and filled with the contacts and assurance of an admired ex-President, pushed this perspective to its natural limits. The difficulty he encountered, but clearly did not fully conceptualize, was that executive administration in the context of a regime of separation of powers contains important elements that are essentially political, and that therefore stand in tension with American ideals ofjudicial nonpartisanship and with the American institution of judicial review. Taft struggled with this tension throughout his tenure as Chief Justice, acting in ways that fell on different sides of what today might be regarded as obvious ethical boundaries.
Taft truly deserves to be known as the father of federal judicial management. We can learn from his difficulties, however, how subtle and complex is the relationship between the imperatives ofjudicial management and American norms of proper judicial behavior. Chief Justices after Taft can no longer share his naive Progressive faith in the neutrality of disinterested administration. In our own fallen world of post-Progressive disillusion, Chief Justices must somehow negotiate between the necessities of functional rationality and the requirements ofjudicial neutrality. If Taft can teach us anything, it is that this negotiation will be neither clear nor easy. Section 2, p. 1: "Of some public men, when they pass into the shadowed valley, it is said that they are the most admired of their generation . . . but about Mr.
Taft there is a universal agreement that he made himself the most loved. Already the language of affection has been exhausted." See "Mr. Taft's Peculiarly enough, Chief Justice Taft has enjoyed a vastly greater popularity since he retired from the presidency than during the period when he was the nation's Chief Executive. The tolerant manner in which he endured defeat, the unselfish support he gave to the man who had defeated him for the presidency, the self-effacement which he practiced during the stirring months of the war period, the logic which he brought to bear in supporting the cause of right and justice, both while the fighting was in progress and during the peace negotiations-all these things were noted by the American people and remembered. The almost unanimous approval which greeted his appointment, both by the Senate and by the country at large, goes far to disprove the theory that republics are ungrateful or that they have short memories. It can be said of William Howard Tafi that at the moment when he leaves the Supreme Court his reputation with the American people is undoubtedly higher than ever before. His term as President saw a steady diminution in his prestige which was reflected in the dismal failure of his candidacy in 1912, at a time when, according to the general political custom of America, he should have had an almost automatic reelection. Since then, by his modesty, geniality and unflagging energy in his work, he has rehabilitated himself to an extent which no one would have ventured to predict eighteen years ago. Directly and indirectly, Taft exercised a profound influence on court procedure, and if the law's delay, of which complaint has been made from time immemorial, shall ever cease to be a subject of complaint it will be in large part due to him." "William Howard Taft During this administration we have given special attention to the machinery of government with a view to increasing its efficiency and reducing its cost. . . . I have secured an appropriation for the appointment of an Economy and Efficiency Commission, consisting of the ablest experts in the country, and they have been working for two years on the question of how the Government departments may be reorganized and what changes can be made with a view to giving them greater effectiveness for governmental purposes on the one hand, and securing this at considerably less cost on the other. States, Senate Document No. 902, 62"d Congress, 2d Session (1912 ). 48Public Law No. 298, 42 Stat. 837 (1922 . 49 Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, "The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System-Part VI: The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges," 40 Hurvard Law Review 431, 456 (1927) .
Speech of William Howard Taft Accepting the Republican Nomination for President of the United
The Act provided, however, that the Senior Circuit Judge of the designated judge must "consent" to the assignment, and the Senior Circuit Judge of the Circuit to which the designated judge is assigned must certify the need for judicial assistance to the Chief Justice.
Although federal judges were preeminently local, there did exist two precedents for the power temporarily to transfer judges. The first was the Act of October 3, 1913, Public Law No. 18, 38 Stat. 203 , which authorized the temporary transfer of judges to the Second Circuit in order to alleviate congestion in New York City, and the second was the authorization to appoint circuit judges on the Commerce Court for service on any circuit court. 445, 445 (1924) . 6sWilliam Howard Taft, "The Courts and the Progressive Party," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 186, No. 39, March 20, 1914, p. 47 . "What is needed," wrote Taft, "is a General Director who shall be able to mass judicial force temporarily at places where the arrears are greatest and thus use what is available to do the whole judicial work. There ought to be more unity in the application of Judges at the strategic points where application is needed." Taft (1916) . "Somebody . . . ought to be made the chief of the body of Judges who cover a certain territory and have the power to assign the business, so that each Judge shall be bound to follow that assignment. There is not the slightest reason why the same strategy . . .
should not be secured as you find in large business corporations. " Taft to Harry A. Hollzer, February 14, 1928, Taft Papers, Reel 299. 67WiIliam Howard Taft, "Address of the President," 39 American Bur Association Report 359, 383 (1914) . 68Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 122 (1926) . 69 Taft was not alone in this conception. Thus Frankfurter and Landis write:
Hundreds ofjudges holding court in as many or more districts scattered over a continent must be subjected to oversight and responsibility as parts of an articulated system of courts. The judiciary, like other political institutions, must be directed. An executive committee of the judges, with the Chief Justice of the United States at its head, is a fit and potent instrument for the task. I just received and read the recommendations of the Judicial Conference. I wish you could be a District Judge for a while just to know what excellent work you and the Conference are doing. The recommendation last year about liquor cases,-that the Federal Courts should entertain only the more important ones,-was of the greatest assistance in dealing with the liquor situation. It gave the District Judges solid standing ground from which to urge that course on the United States Attorneys, who are rather inclined to prosecute everybody for everything lest they be accused of favoritism or remissness. It is too bad that we in the Court here in Washington do not have greater opportunity to meet in the flesh the Judges who are on the firing line in the Federal Judiciary, and who have so much labor thrust on them which they do not have assistance enough properly to dispose of. I am constantly afraid of hearing of the breaking down of some of the District Judges under the burden they have to carry, and I wish you to know that we here at the Nation's Capital are fully conscious of the debt that we and the country owe to you District Judges. Although the northern district of New York was not included among the districts for which the conference of senior circuit judges has recommended additional district judges, Chief Justice Taft, who presides over the conference, has, since the last meeting of the conference, specially examined the situation in the northern district of New York and concluded that an additional district judge is needed there. The Chief Justice says: "I have been examining the statistics of the cases in the northern district of New York and in the western district, and I am bound to concede that the showing is strong for an additional judge in the northern district as well as in the western district." Senate Report No. 1557 , 69th Congress, 2nd Sess. (February 27,1927 It is a source of some embarrassment for me to rise here and not to talk to you as I would like to talk to you, free from the fetters of the office which I hold. . . . I am struggling to be worthy of the bench of which I am a member. I am struggling to fall into the customs and requirements of that position. We have been warned in the Senate of the United States what our narrow function is and with due respect to that warning, I am going to confine myself to a written manuscript.
Id. at 1-2. For press coverage of the speech, see "Taft Approves Laws to Clear Court Dockets," New York Tribune, February 19, 1922, p.13 Taft's A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe the operation of statutes, especially those relating to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend to impede the just disposition of controversies; and he may well contribute to the public interest by advising those having authority to remedy defects of procedure, of the result of his observation and experience.
An early version of this Canon, drafted about June 1922, was even more explicit:
Judges have a peculiar opportunity to observe the operation of statutes, especially those relating to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend to impede the reasonable and just disposition of controversies; they should not be indifferent to shocking results; and they may well contribute to the public interest by advising both the people and their representatives of the result of their observation and experience; there is no need of diffidence in this respect, ouf of a false fear of being considered to be unduly interfering with another department of the Government.
Judges may well direct diligent effort toward securing from proper authority such modifications of laws or rules tending, in their experience, to impede or prevent the reasonable and just disposition of litigation, as will rectify the evils discovered by them.
Charles Boston to Taft, June 8, 1922, Taft Papers, Reel 242 . For the ABA's most recent standard on this subject, see ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1990) , Canon 4(B), Comment 1. Il8S. 3151,70thCong., 1st Sess. (February 13, 1928) . On opposition to federal court diversity jurisdiction in the South and West, see Tony A. Freyer, "The Federal Courts, Localism, and the National Economy, 1865-1900," 53 Business Histoy Review 343 (1 979); Hany N. Scheiber,
In an address at the San Francisco meeting of the American Bar Association, Chief Justice Taft, while disclaiming any discussion of legislative policy, made the following pertinent remarks by way of comment on the proposal to relieve the Federal courts of congestion by taking away this jurisdiction: "I venture to think that there may be a strong dissent from the view that danger of local prejudice in State Courts against nonresidents is at an end. Litigants from the eastern part of the country who are expected to invest their capital in the West or South will hardly concede the proposition that their interests as creditors will be as sure of impartial judicial consideration in a Western or Southern state as in a federal court.
The rnateriat question is not so much whether the justice administered is actually impartial and fair, as it is whether it is thought to be so by those who are considering the wisdom of investing their capital in States where that capital is needed for the promotion of enterprises and industrial and commercial progress. No single element . . . in our governmental system has done so much to secure capital for the legitimate development of enterprises throughout the West and South as the existence of Federal courts there, with a jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship cases." 1923) . In his address before the ABA, Taft had also been careful to observe: "But of course the taking away of fundamental jurisdiction from the Federal Courts is within the power of Congress, and it is not for me to discuss such a legislative policy." Id. at 11.
Brandeis did not accept Taft's point about the importance of diversity jurisdiction for facilitating the investment of eastern capital in western and southern states:
He speaks feelingly on the subject whenever it comes up. I think his point is theoretical, like much of the economists mouthing of the "rational man." Of course, the bankers & still less the investors, do not give the subject of litigation any thought when they make loans. 8077, pt. 8, May 8, 1928 . Somehow Taft managed to acquire a copy of a letter sent by Norris to Lewis Gannett of The Nation explaining the proposed change in S. 3151. In the letter Norris writes that the "principal object of this bill . . . is to take away the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in the diversity of citizenship. It is true the hill takes away some other jurisdictions, but the other items we thought were of very little importance. However, there is no objection to amending the bill so as to confine it entirely to diverse citizenship cases." Norris to Gannett, April 28, 1928. Taft sent the letter to Willis Van Devanter, dryly commenting: "I send you herewith a copy of a letter written by Norris . . . 3, 1925, Taft Papers, Reel 278 . Ever tactful, Taft sent a similar letter to Senator Thomas Walsh, the most influential Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Taft to Thomas Walsh, December 3, 1925, Taft Papers, Reel 278. Walsh replied that "We are so near together in our ideas concerning the measure for the relief of the District Judges that there should be no difficulty in meeting each other's views." Walsh preferred, however, to lodge the appointment power in the President rather than the District courts. Thomas Walsh to Taft, December 4, 1925, Taft Papers, Reel 278 . Taft responded that he did "not wish to insist on the appointment by the District Judges," and that he would be "glad to talk further with you about it, because something ought to be done." Taft One of the great difficulties has arisen by reason of the invasion of what belonged heretofore to the States alone through the adoption of the eighteenth amendment. By the adoption of that amendment a great burden of police work was cast upon the Federal Government without furnishing that Government the proper equipment and machinery for carrying on the work created by the adoption of the eighteenth amendment and the laws intended to carry it into effect. That is one reason why the business of the courts is suffering, why the courts are congested . . . . Vol. 186, No. 39, March 20, 1914, p. 47: [Sltate legislatures have cut down the power of the judge so that now in many states he has little more power to exercise than the moderator in a religious conference. In some states he is required to deliver a written charge before argument of counsel, and in others he is permitted only to accept or reject the statements of the law as given by counsel. His opportunity for usefulness is curtailed, his impartiality made the subject of suspicion by most unwise restrictions, and the trial is turned over largely to the control of the lawyers and the little restrained discretion of the jury. The result has been the perversion of justice in jury trials, the infusion into them of much maudlin sentiment and irrelevant considerations, and a dragging out of the trial to such a length that if it be a civil case the cost of litigation is greatly increased, and if it be a criminal case the public come to treat it as a game of wits and eloquence of counsel rather than the settlement of a serious controversy in a court of justice. Neither the dignity nor the effectiveness of judicial administration under these conditions impresses itself upon the public. 16*Taft to Helen Herron Taft, April 30, 1924, Taft Papers, Reel 639. Taft continued: "Congressman Snell, who is the Chairman of the Committee on Rules in the House, promised me that he could postpone the bill. I saw the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Graham, and he thinks he can. I think 1 shall try and see Nick Longworth, the leader of the House, tomorrow, and with those agreed, I hope the plan of delay can be carried out. It will he a good deal easier to induce the President to veto the bill after the election than before." I63Taft to Thomas W. Shelton, April 13, 1924, Taft Papers, Reel 263 . Taft noted that "I am not in a position to appear before the committee myself, because were I to oppose it, it would only sharpen the eagerness of many to put it through." Taft to Gardiner Lathrop, April 27, 1924, Taft Papers, Reel 264. On Bar opposition to the measure, see "The Effort to Limit Power of Federal Judges," 10 ABAJ 303 (1924) ("The bill is part and parcel of a vicious plan to destroy the powers and independence of the Federal Judiciary, and to invade
Id

